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Bankruptcy-
ORDER TRANSFERRING RAILROAD
REORGANIZATION FROM
BANKRUPTCY TO EQUITY REVERSED
The Florida East Coast Railway went into equity receivership in
1931 when it was unable to meet its fixed charges on outstanding bonds.'
Ten years later the case was transferred to a bankruptcy court for reor-
ganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Since that time
the Interstate Commerce Commission has approved four plans for re-
organizing the debtor, but only three have been certified to the district
court.8  None has been approved by that court. The first two plans pro-
vided for a simple internal reorganization whereby the bondholders would
have become the owners of the railroad in place of the present stockholder.4
The third and fourth plans involved a merger of Florida East Coast with
the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. The third plan was rejected by the
district court as illegal because the proposed merger was not assented to
by the bondholders.5 The court of appeals affirmed on an alternate hold-
ing that the plan was not "fair and equitable," but refused to hold a "forced
merger" illegal.6 When the ICC certified a fourth plan substantially
similar to the third, the district court held it unfair and inequitable.T This
1. The Florida East Coast has two bond issues currently outstanding. The first,
a series of 432% bonds, principal amount $12,000,000, secured by a first mortgage,
issued in 1909 for a period of 50 years, has never been in default. The difficulty.
arose from a second series of 5% bonds, principal amount $45,000,000, secured by
a first and refunding mortgage, issued in 1924 for a period of 50 years. This latter
issue has been in default on interest payments since 1931. Hereafter, the use of the
term "bondholders" in this Comment is a reference to the holders of the second
issue, 5% bonds.
2. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §205
(1952).
3. Reorganization plans under the statute must be approved by the ICC before
they are certified to the district court. See note 38 infra. The history of the pro-
ceedings before the ICC is reported under the title of Florida East Coast Ry. Re-
organization as follows: first plan, 252 I.C.C. 423, 731 (1942); second plan, 261
I.C.C. 151 (1945) ; third plan, 267 I.C.C. 295 (1947), 267 I.C.C. 729 (1948) ; fourth
plan, 282 I.C.C. 81, 195 (1951). The second plan was never certified to the district
court. See Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 261 I.C.C. 151, 187-93 (1945);
id., 267 I.C.C. 295, 296 (1947).
4. See note 3 supra. The first plan was held unfair and inequitable for its failure
to make adequate disposition of a cash surplus that had accumulated since its approval
by the ICC. In re Florida East Coast Ry., 52 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Fla. 1943).
5. In re Florida East Coast Ry., 81 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
6. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 179 F2d 538 (5th Cir.) (2-1
decision), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 929 (1950).
7. In re Florida East Coast Ry., 103 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Fla. 1952). Judge
Strum considered himself bound by the dictum in the prior opinion of the court of
appeals that a forced merger might be legal and therefore did not review the fourth
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decision eventually was taken to the Supreme Court which held that the
plan for merger of the debtor railroad with another was illegal unless
initiated by each carrier.8 The case was remanded to the district court
which refused to receive evidence that, since the sole stockholder 9 now
assented to such a plan, the merger proposed by the fourth plan was not
forced.10 Instead the court ordered the proceedings in bankruptcy dis-
missed and the case transferred into an equity receivership.1 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, but three conflicting opinions
were filed. A per curiam opinion apparently spoke for all three judges
in overruling the trial judge's finding that there had been undue delay
in the Section 77 proceedings, and in holding that it was error to transfer
the case into an equity court.'2 The divergence of opinions was on the
matter of future disposition of the case and stems from variations in in-
terpretation of the prior Supreme Court holding. The per curiamn opinion
and Judge Russell agreed that the Court had declared the fourth plan
illegal and therefore beyond further consideration, but Judge Russell went
further to indicate that he believed any plan which effected a merger with-
out the consent of the bondholders was not only illegal but also unfair and
inequitable.'8  Judge Holmes construed the Court's opinion as merely
laying down a broad principle about "forced mergers" against which the
fourth plan should not be tested. 14 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. St. Joe
Paper Co., 216 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 524
(1955).
plan on that issue. Id. at 834. However, the court of appeals reversed his decision
as if he had again held the plan illegal. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. St. Joe Paper
Co., 201 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1953) (3-2 decision). The circuit court also reversed
the decision that the plan was unfair and inequitable on the ground that the ICC's
finding to the contrary has "full support in the evidence." Id. at 329.
Section 77(e) provides that ". . . the judge shall approve the plan if satisfied
. . . it . . . is fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of each
class of creditors and stockholders, [and] does not discriminate unfairly in favor of
any class of creditors and stockholders. . . ." 47 STAT.'1478 (1933), as amended,
49 STAT. 1969 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §205(e) (1952).
8. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298 (1954) (4-3
decision). This case is discussed in Notes, 64 YALE L.J. 282 (1954), 68 H.Av.
L. REv. 96, 165-68 (1954). The Court's holding is derived from its interpretation
of the consistency clause of the Bankruptcy Act as requiring that the procedure of
§ 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act be followed even in § 77 proceedings.
9. All the outstanding stock of Florida East Coast is owned by one party. See
Note, 64 YALE L.. 282, 286 n.29 (1954).
10. In the Matter of Florida East Coast Ry., 127 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. Fla.
1954) (per curiam opinion by Strum, 3.).
11. Ibid. This disposition is identical to that ordered by the district court in
1952. On appeal, the order was reversed with virtually no discussion of that point.
See notes 7-8 supra.
12. Instant case at 837. Under this statute, the decision to dismiss the bank-
ruptcy proceedings is committed to the discretion of the district court. See text
at note 25 infra. The court of appeals made no finding of abuse of discretion,
but seemed to rest its reversal on the ground that their prior opinion, while reversed
in part by the Supreme Court, was nevertheless the law of the case on this issue
which had not been considered by the Supreme Court.
13. Instant case at 838-39.
14. Instant case at 837-38.
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Railroad reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 15
is a complex procedure involving the dual jurisdiction of the federal courts
and the Interstate Commerce Commission.' The case is shuttled back
and forth between these two tribunals at various phases of the process.'
7
The role each is to play, while ambiguous in the statutory provisions,' 8
has been clarified by the Supreme Court principally in the Western
Pacific 19 and Milwaukee 20 cases. In considering a plan certified by the
ICC, the district court has a limited scope of review of the finding that
the plan "will be compatible with the public interest" under Section 77 (d) .21
On the other hand, the court must exercise independent judgment in the
determination of whether or not the plan is "fair and equitable" under
Section 77(e). 22 "Fair and equitable" is the standard developed in equity
reorganizations to assure adequate protection of the interests of creditors
and stockholders and is therefore a concept which the courts are peculiarly
qualified to apply.23 The co-ordinate action of Section 77 proceedings
thus raises the possibility of a stalemate should it happen that the ICC finds
that public interest forbids a certain condition to exist while the court
decides that no other condition would be fair and equitable.2 4 One solu-
15. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §205
(1952).
16. See Craven & Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy
Law, 49 H.xv. L. REV. 1254, 1284 (1936); Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad
Reorganization Act, 36 CoL. L. REv. 27, 37 (1936).
17. This case has proceeded through only the first few steps of the process.
Justice Douglas outlined the full process in his dissent in St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 321, 322 (1954).
18. Both the ICC and the court, for example, are directed to approve a plan
only if it conforms to the requirements of § 77(b). Of necessity the court will
consider the matter after the ICC, but it is unclear what the scope of review should
be. In addition, confusion arises from the relation between §77(d) and §77(e).
The former, which is basically the standards by which the ICC measures a plan,
directs the ICC to approve a plan only if it complies with the standards of § 77(e),
which contains the standards to be applied by the court. The test of fairness and
equitableness is in the provision primarily applicable to the court, but indirectly
incorporated into the task of the ICC. Consequently the ICC makes findings on
those matters which must be considered later by the court without any guide in the
statute as to the respect to be accorded the agency's findings.
19. Ecker v. Western Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
20. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 318 U.S.
523 (1943). See also Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization Under Section
77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1040-51 (1943).
21. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Fleming, 157 F.2d 241 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 780 (1946); In re Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 150 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.
1945), rev'd on other grounds, 328 U.S. 495 (1946); In re Missouri Pac. R.R.,
93 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 904 (1952).
22. See cases cited in note 21 supra. But cf. the court of appeals holding that
the fourth plan for reorganizing Florida East Coast should be approved because
there was "full support in the evidence" for the ICC finding that the plan was fair
and equitable. Atlantic Coast Line RtR. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 201 F.2d 325 (5th
Cir. 1953) (3-2 decision).
23. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (action
under § 77B of Bankruptcy Act). See also Note, 64 YALE L.J. 282 n.7 (1954).
24. Cf. Craven & Fuller, supra note 16, at 1284; Friendly, supra note 16, at
37-38.
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tion for such a deadlock is found in Section 77(g) which provides that
the district court, in its discretion, shall dismiss the bankruptcy proceed-
ings if there has been undue delay in a reasonably expeditious reorganiza-
tion.25
The dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings by the district court in
the instant case was a means of overcoming the impasse, which had de-
veloped under Section 77 and was caused by the struggle between the
duPont interests 26 and Atlantic Coast Line for control of the Florida
East Coast system. Each of the protagonists became seriously interested
in gaining control after the inception of the reorganization proceedings
under Section 77. After the ICC's first plan indicated that an internal
reorganization would result in the bondholders of the debtor becoming the
stockholders in the new company,2 7 the duPont interests increased their
holdings of the debtor's bonds, until they owned an absolute majority.
28
Atlantic Coast Line did not appear until the second plan had been ap-
proved by the ICC, and eventually it persuaded the commission to reopen
its hearings. 29 Both probably desire to win control because of the excellent
present condition and the apparently prosperous future of the system which
provides the only rail outlet to the citrus growing area along the east
coast of Florida. In addition, Atlantic Coast Line, if successful, would add
to its system the Jacksonville to Miami route, thus enabling it to compete
with Seaboard Airline Railway which is the only other line that serves
that resort area.30 The ICC has adopted a hostile position to the duPont
interests for the expressed reason that their control of a chain of banks
in Florida, together with control of Florida East Coast, would create a
situation that might be prejudicial to shippers and the public.31 The dis-
trict court has been equally insistent that it would be unfair and inequitable
to take the railroad away from its present equitable owners, the bond-
25. 49 STAT. 921 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §205(g) (1952), amending 47 STAT. 1476
(1933).
26. The duPont interests that are involved in this controversy are the Alfred
I. duPont Testamentary Trust and its subsidiary, the St. Joe Paper Company. See
Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 267 I.C.C. 295, 313-18 (1947).
27. See Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 252 I.C.C. 423, 731 (1942).
28. The duPont interests own about $25,000,000 of the $45,000,000 bond issue.
About $8,000,000 of these holdings were acquired after the ICC had certified the first
plan. Despite the fact that the duPont interests would gain control of Florida East
Coast under the second plan, the ICC approved the plan, but on rehearing rejected
it in favor of the third plan. See Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 261
I.C.C. 151, 152-53 (1945); id., 267 I.C.C. 295, 296 (1947); id., 282 I.C.C. 81, 84
(1951).
29. The Atlantic Coast Line first appears in the controversy in a petition by the
Lynch interests, minority bondholders, to reopen proceedings after the hearings were
concluded on the second plan. The first proposal was for merely a transfer of
control of Florida East Coast to Atlantic Coast Line and not an outright merger.
This petition was denied. Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 261 I.C.C. 151,
187-93 (1945). Thereafier the Atlantic Coast Line purchased a block of unsecured
claims and appeared in the case in its own right to propose the merger plans. See
Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 267 I.C.C. 295 (1947).
30. See PzmmR WoPLa Am.As 81 (Rand McNally & Co. 1952).
31. See, e.g., Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 81, 187 (1951).
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holders.as Since the Bankruptcy Act requires the approval of both tri-
bunals it appeared that an impasse had been reached. The district court's
order transferring the case into equity would have made it possible to
break the deadlock because in equity reorganizations, the ICC is not called
upon to consider the plan.P It is virtually certain that an equity reor-
ganization, which proceeds through foreclosure and sale of the debtor's
assets, would result in duPont and the minority bondholders obtaining
control.34 The reasoning of the circuit court that the transfer is unde-
sirable,35 perhaps even improper,-" because an equity court has less power
than a bankruptcy court ignores the fact that an equity court could effect
a speedy reorganization.
The future development of this controversy is not certain, but it
appears very likely that its ultimate conclusion may be reached only after
many more years of fruitless litigation. At present the case is about to
embark on a fresh journey through the procedures of Section 77.37 The
first step is referral to the ICC for the formulation and certification of
a new plan.3 8 Assuming that none of the parties will abandon its past
position, there are two principal directions in which the case could move:
another attempt at amalgamating Florida East Coast with Atlantic Coast
Line, or a recognition of the bondholders of the debtor as its actual owners.
32. See notes 5, 7, 10 supra.
33. While not called upon to review the reorganization plan, the ICC must
approve the issuance of securities by the new corporation under §20a(2) of the
Interstate Commerce Act. 41 STAT. 494 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §20a(2)
(1952). This provision gave the ICC little power in practice to assert any sig-
nificant control over reorganizations. That fact was one of the strong motivating
factors in the original adoption of a railroad reorganization act. See Fuller, The
Background and Techniques of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganizations-
A Survey, 7 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 377, 384 (1940) ; Letter from Joseph B. East-
man to Senator Daniel 0. Hastings, Jan. 31, 1933, included in Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1869, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 288,
290 (1939). See Investigation of Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 131 I.C.C. 615, 671
(1938). It is very doubtful whether ICC consideration of the issuance of the new
securities could properly include the character of the interests that control the
management of the railroad. Cf. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R.,
282 U.S. 311 (1931); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Miller v. United States, 277 Fed. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Compare Badenhausen v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 145 F.2d 40, 50-51 (4th Cir. 1944), with New England Coal &
Coke Co. v. Rutland Ry., 143 F.2d 179, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1944), on the issue of the
ICC's authority under J 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act as compared with its
authority under § 77(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.
34. The certainty arises from the fact that at the foreclosure sale the bondholders
could buy in the railroad and pay for it with their bonds and twenty years of
accumulated interest while an outsider such as Atlantic Coast Line could not raise
the money necessary to outbid them. Fuller, supra note 33, at 382.
35. See instant case at 835. The per curiam opinion emphasizes its analysis
by quoting Hamlet's castigation of his mother for marrying his uncle who had
murdered his father: "Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed, and batten on
this moor?" (SHAXESPEARE, HAmLeT, act III scene 4). Id. at 835-36.
36. Judge Holmes, in his concurring opinion, states ". . . it was not necessary
or proper for the district court . . . to revive powers that it already possessed in
the bankruptcy proceeding." Instant case at 838.
37. On this point the per curiam and the second concurring opinions are in agree-
ment. See text preceding note 13 supra.
38. The district court is without authority to proceed without a plan approved
by the ICC; the court may not even modify any provision of a plan after it has
been certified. Smith v. Hoboken R.R., 328 U.S. 123 (1946); In re Alton R.R.,
159 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1947).
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The choice of either will depend largely upon what the ICC construes to
be the law of the case.
Presumably the commission will refuse to alter its prior finding that
duPont control is not compatible with the public interest.39 Only five
of the present eleven commissioners have voted on this issue before, but
four of the five were aligned against duPont 40 If the ICC certifies a
fifth plan again providing for a merger, the defect of illegality found in
the fourth plan must be cured. Such a "cure" is perhaps available through
the assent of the present stockholder who apparently is agreeable. 41 To
sustain this position the ICC would have to interpret the Supreme Court
opinion as requiring only the prior assent of the board of directors or
stockholder of the debtor to make the initiation legal.- In so doing, the
ICC would be relying heavily on certain accidental language in the
opinion.4 But the Court's holding is more sensible if restricted to the
39. Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 81, 187 (1951).
40. Four of the commissioners, Johnson, Alldredge, Cross and Knudson, voted
in favor of the fourth plan. Commissioners Johnson and Alldredge each supported
the internal reorganization in the first plan, and Commissioner Alldredge .went
along with the second plan while Commissioner Johnson did not then paricipate.
Both have consistently supported merger plans since the third plan. Only one
commissioner, Mitchell, remains from the group who opposed the merger idea. The
other six commissioners have not participated in any prior decisions in this case:
Elliott, Arpaia, Clarke, Freas, Tuggle and Hutchinson. Assuming that the first
four continue to hold the same views as before, it is more than likely that at least
two of the newer commissioners will go along. See note 3 supra.
41. See In the Matter of Florida East Coast Ry., 127 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.
Fla. 1954).
42. This is apparently the rationale of the offer of evidence that the trustee for
the stockholder adopted the fourth plan in the district court following the remand
of the case from the Supreme Court. Ibid.
Most expressions of interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion conclude
that at least stockholder approval is necessary for a merger to be legally initiated.
See, e.g., Justice Douglas, dissenting: "To allow the old management or the stock-
holders a veto power where Congress has provided they shall not vote is to indulge
in as bold a piece of judicial legislation as one can find in the books." St. Joe
Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 321, 328 (1954). See Notes,
64 YALE L.J. 282 (1954), 68 HI-Iv. L. REv. 96, 165-68 (1954). See also note 43
infra. The court in the instant case divided on this point. The per curiam opinion
apparently interprets the Court's holding as referring to the stockholders. Instant
case at 834. Judge Russell wrote ". . . the decision should be construed to hold
that the equitable owners of the property supplant in interest the holders of the
worthless stock and are thus entitled to the say-so on the question of merger ..
Id. at 838.
43. The principal basis for inferring that Justice Frankfurter believed that the
stockholders must be the moving party in any merger plan is the language in a
footnote to his opinion in which he describes a railroad as a living concern, albeit
bankrupt, and specifically cites the existence and functioning of a board of directors
for Florida East Coast throughout the twenty-four years of pending reorganization.
Continuing he then states ". . . that those who in the absence of § 77 would
wield the corporate merger powers must initiate and work out the merger now."
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 309 n.12 (1954). He
concludes by mention of a duty which § 77 specifically places on the old manage-
ment. The consistent reference to the interest of the stockholder makes it appear
likely that this is the interest which wields the merger power in the ambiguous
phrase quoted above. See Notes, 64 YALE L.J. 282, 287 (1954), 68 Hhav. L. REv.
96, 167 (1954).
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point that the ICC cannot initiate a merger, for the only plan before the
Court had been approved by the ICC without any assent by any group
which could be said to have represented Florida East Coast.44 Since the
stock of the debtor has been held valueless, 45 the equitable owners of the
railroad are the bondholders. It seems certain that, whether or not the
stockholder's assent is deemed necessary, the bondholders must partici-
pate in whatever decision is to be that of the debtor. Once that require-
ment is recognized, the already expressed opposition by the bondholders
precludes any merger plan from legally being initiated.46
An alternate method for accomplishing the same result, without the
problem of legality in initiation, is suggested by the language of the fourth
plan.47  Although treated as a merger plan, it provided three methods of
implementation: merger, consolidation, and transfer or sale. All three
are included in the same section of the Interstate Commerce Act, which
establishes the procedures for legality of initiation,4 8 but the act has been
interpreted to require, in a case of transfer or sale, only the carrier which
is seeking to purchase the assets of another to propose the plan.4 9 A trans-
fer or sale, then, could be legally initiated and certified by the ICC without
any group formally taking part on behalf of Florida East Coast.50 While
this would seem to avoid the difficulty in the merger plans, it is, as the
fourth plan itself illustrates, merely a change of labels with no modifica-
tion in the transaction.m 5 A fifth plan thus limited to the transfer method
44. The merger idea was proposed by the Atlantic Coast Line as owner of a block
of unsecured claims against the Florida East Coast. See Florida East Coast Ry.
Reorganization, 267 I.C.C. 295, 297-98 (1947).
45. The Florida East Coast stock was declared without value by the ICC in
its hearings on the first plan. Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 252 I.C.C.
423, 465 (1942). That finding continued unchallenged until the court in the instant
case recognized that the merger power arising from the Supreme Court opinion
gives it economic value. Instant case at 834. None of the four plans has included
any compensation for the stockholders. See In re Florida East Coast Ry., 103
F. Supp. 825, 835 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
46. See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 282, 285 n.21 (1954).
47. "On the consummation date all the business, assets, franchises, and prop-
erty . . . constituting the estate of the debtor . . . shall be vested in the Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company by merger of the debtor into, or consolidation of
the debtor with, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, or, if the court shall
approve, by transfer and conveyance by the . . . trustees of the property of the
debtor to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company ... " Florida East Coast
Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 195, 213 (1951).
48. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 54 STAT. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (a)
(1952).
49. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Purchase, 254 I.C.C. 486 (1943) ; Alton R.R. Reorgani-
zation, 261 I.C.C. 343 (1945). Justice Douglas first considered this analysis in a
memorandum opinion filed when the Court denied petitions for a rehearing. Welbon
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 980 (1954).
50. This is apparently the thrust of one of the contentions in the cross-petition
for writ of certiorari filed on behalf of Atlantic Coast Line. See 23 U.S.L. WzzK
3219 (U.S. March 8, 1955).
51. In denying the petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court may have con-
cluded that a transfer or sale is simply a de facto merger, although no opinion was
filed to articulate its position. See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 282, 289 n.47 (1954).
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of implementation, but otherwise substantially identical with the third and
fourth, would probably be held illegal by the courts.
If either a merger or a sale is incorporated into a plan which does pass
the test of legality in its initiation, there are still difficult stages through
which it must proceed. Probably the most important of these is the
almost inevitable "cram down" proceeding. 52 Whether or not the bond-
holders have a voice in a plan's initiation, the statute is unequivocal that
they vote on it before it is executed.5 The outcome of that vote ap-
parently would fall far short of the requisite two-thirds and would prob-
ably raise a unique problem of whether a court would invoke "cram down"
against the overwhelming opposition of the equitable owners of the
debtor."4 A lesser problem, perhaps, is the district court's appraisal of
the plan for fairness and equitableness. Exercising independent judgment,
no trial or appellate court has held either of the two previously certified
merger plans to fulfill this requirement.5 5 The expressed basis for re-
jection has been the failure of the plan fully to compensate the bondholders
for the value of their interests.5 6 The question of adequacy of compensa-
tion is complicated by the fact that duPont would be losing more in eco-
nomic value than the minority bondholders because of the deprivation of
the power to control the new company.57 While apparently not discussed
on the former opinions, it is a troublesome point whether that loss requires
compensation and, if so, how it is to be measured.5 8
The morass of litigation facing a renewed effort to join Florida East
Coast and Atlantic Coast Line and the very slight possibility of that effort
succeeding furnish good reason to re-evaluate the second principal direc-
tion in which this case could go. The ICC could come forward with
an internal reorganization plan similar to the first two plans. Inasmuch
52. A plan is first approved by the ICC which certifies it to the court. If the
court accepts it, it is returned to the ICC for submission to each class of security
holders who vote on it. In the event that less than two-thirds of any class accepts,
provision is made to adopt the plan despite their objections. This power to over-
ride by order of the district court is known as "cram down." See Craven & Fuller,
mtpra note 16, at 1276-83; Swaine, supra note 20, at 1052-54.
53. This is found in paragraph 2 of § 77(e). 47 STAT. 1477 (1933), as amended,
49 STAT. 918 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §205(e) (1952).
54. See notes 5, 7, 10, 46 supra.
55. The court of appeals did hold, however, that there was substantial evidence
to support an ICC finding that the fourth plan was fair and equitable. Atlantic
Coast Line MR. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 201 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1953) (3-2 decision).
56. In re Florida East Coast Ry., 103 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
57. See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.
Pa. 1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct 1941).
58. This is a somewhat unique problem in determination of what is fair and
equitable since that concept when used in equity applied to internal reorganizations
because it was virtually impossible for an outsider to bid in the debtor's property.
See note 34 supra. Under § 77 there seems to be no precedent for a complete
absorption of the debtor by an unrelated outside corporation. Cf. In re Huntington
& Broad Top Mountain R.R., 213 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1954); In re Pittsburgh,
S. & N.R.R., 75 F. Supp. 292 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (disintegration of small railroads
which had become economically unfeasible to operate).
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as this would mean duPont control,59 further analysis of the previous ICC
position that duPont control is not compatible with the public interest
is required. Undoubtedly the ICC finding on this matter deserves weight,
but it appears from the reports that the ICC was not so much measuring
duPont control against an independent standard of public interest as com-
paring, in terms of the national transportation policy, the efficacy of an
internal reorganization against a merger with Atlantic Coast Line.6 0 The
specific charges against duPont center on the possibility that its other
financial investments in Florida put it in a position to exert influence on
other shippers and to further its own interest to the public detriment.6'
However, the ICC split on voting on these reports,6 2 and the district court
rejected the charges as without support in the evidence.6 Over and
above the disagreements on this issue is the further problem of the in-
herent importance of the question itself. Congress has never granted
to the ICC the authority generally to dictate the character of railroad
management. If, for example, Florida East Coast had been solvent and
duPont had purchased controlling interest in its stock, the ICC could not
59. The idea of a voting trust has been suggested, but the ICC rejected it as
unfeasible as a means of preventing the duPont interests from exercising control
beyond a short period. Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 232 I.C.C. 81, 128
(1951). See In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Mo. 1945) (five
year voting trust proposed ". . . to, assure a stable, experienced and impartial
management while the new company is getting on its feet." Id. at 72).
60. See Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 267 I.C.C. 295, 307-49 (1947);
id., 282 I.C.C. 81, 119-28 (1951).
61. E.g., Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 81 (1951).
[T]he power and influence which the Du Pont trust can exert is obvious. If the
St. Joe Company were permitted to control the reorganized company, there would
be a measure of interrelation between that company and the industries it serves
which we must consider. . . . Through its banking interests, the Du Pont trust
would be in a position to influence a great number shippers (sic) to route their
shipments over any connecting carrier which it may wish to favor." Id. at 121.
62. The voting on the first two plans did not raise the issue of merger versus
internal reorganization. The second plan would have resulted in duPont control
of the reorganized company, but the ICC voted 10-0 in favor of the plan. Unanimity
disappeared with consideration of the third and fourth plans. The third was
originally adopted by a 5-4 vote and later affirmed by a 6-5 vote. The size of the
dissenting group diminished on the fourth plan with two identical votes of 7-3 in
favor of the plan. Since the first plan, a total of fourteen commissioners have cast
ballots in the reorganization of the debtor. Six originally supported an internal
plan, but shifted to favor a merger when that idea arose. Six others have voted
consistently in favor of internal reorganization. Two new commissioners voted
only in the proceedings on the fourth plan when they supported merger. See note
3 supra.
At present, the majority of the commissioners is composed of men who have
not heretofore participated in the matter of reorganizing Florida East Coast. See
note 40 supra.
63. In re Florida East Coast Ry., 103 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Fla. 1952). "The Com-
mission's findings as to public interest are wholly unsupported by evidence." Id. at
842. The court of appeals reversed on this point. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. St.
Joe Paper Co., 201 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1953). 'We have, therefore, again carefully
examined the record made in this and the former hearing, and have found: that there
is abundant evidence to support the public interest finding. . . ." Id. at 329. The
issue was not included in the narrow writ of certiorari, St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 948 (1953), and was not considered by the Supreme
Court.
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prohibit it from assuming control on the ground of public interest.6 4  The
Comrmission's power to do so in this case is ancillary to the railroad's
being reorganized under Section 77.65 In that perspective, it is possible
that the ICC finding has been magnified beyond its real significance. If
it is in fact largely expressive of the ICC's determination that Atlantic
Coast Line control is more compatible with the public interest than duPont
control, then the most formidable obstacle in the path of an internal re-
organization is minimized. Should the ICC decide to certify a plan for
internal reorganization, a reasonably expeditious conclusion to this con-
troversy is certain.
Internal Revenue-
COSTS OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION MAY BE EXPENSED
On threat of suit by the Urquhart partnership for patent infringe-
ment, the Pyrene Manufacturing Company sought a declaratory judgment
that the Urquhart patents were invalid or that, if valid, Pyrene was not
infringing. The partnership counterclaimed for an injunction against in-
fringement and an accounting for profits and damages, In this suit, the
patents were held invalid; thus, the question of infringement was not
reached.' In computing its net income for the year of the suit, the part-
nership deducted approximately $55,700 the cost of litigating the suit,
as an ordinary and necessary expense 2 of its business of inventing, ex-
64. This is subject to the limitation in § 5 (2) (a) (i) of the Interstate Commerce
Act which deals with the right of a person to acquire control of one carrier if he
already has control of one or more other carriers. In the report on the second
plan which would have given duPont control, the ICC noted that the estate then
controlled another railroad in Florida but that it intended to apply for approval
under § 5 of the Commerce Act and to divest itself of control of the other railroad
if approval was not granted. Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 261 I.C.C. 151,
185 n.6 (1945).
65. The use of § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act to effect a reorganization is not
mandatory. Initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings may be effected by the debtor
itself or creditors with claims of 59 of the total indebtedness, but neither is required
to do so. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C.
§205(a) (1952). It has been held that there is no need to transfer from equity
into bankruptcy because the ICC can perform its statutory functions equally effectively
under § 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act. Badenhausen v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
145 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1944). But see note 33 supra. In a broad sense, even the
holding of the Supreme Court in this case is expressive of the conscious Con-
gressional intent to delimit the power of the ICC. , St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298 (1954).
1. Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Urquhart, 175 F.2d 409 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
826 (1949). Shortly thereafter, Urquhart's non-exclusive licensee, National Foam,
successfully withdrew from the licensing agreement because of Urquhart's misuse
of the patents. See National Foam System, Inc. v. Urquhart, 202 F.2d 659 (3d
Cir. 1953). Then, Urquhart unsuccessfully sued the United States, asserting validity
of the patents and claiming compensation for their unauthorized use. See Urquhart
v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1953). The litigation costs of the latter
two suits are not pertinent to this Comment.
2. "All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business . . ." are deductible from gross income.
1955]
976 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
ploiting, and licensing patents.3 The Commissioner disallowed the deduc-
tion, analogizing litigation of the patent's validity to "defending or per-
fecting title to property," 4 and the tax court affirmed his ruling.5 The
court of appeals reversed, noticing that "title" was not involved, and
holding that despite a decision on the issue of validity, the expenses were
nonetheless deductible because patent infringement suits are brought to
recover profits.6 Urquhart v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954).
The doctrine that costs of litigation should be added to the capitalized
value of an asset is embodied in the "defense of title" regulation.7 This
regulation is an elaboration of the word "betterment" in Section 24(a) (2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 providing that no deduction from
gross income shall be allowed for "[a] ny amounts paid out for . . . per-
manent improvements or betterments of any property . "...$y 8 Con-
sonant with Section 113(a) of the 1939 Code,9 which provides for the
basis of property, these costs are not deducted in the current year but
are added to the original cost of the property with the result that they are
included as a part of the depreciation deduction which is taken over a
period of years.10 Capitalization of expenditures which enhance the value
of an asset seems justified by the long-term nature of the benefits re-
ceived, such as increased marketability and enlarged rights of enjoyment.'1
However, courts rarely articulate the economic reasons behind the "de-
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a) (1), 52 STAT. 460 (1938) (now INT. Rsv. CODE OF
1954, § 162). There are no substantive changes in the new Code. See H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A43 (1954) ; SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
196 (1954).
3. The business of this patentee should be distinguished from that of a short-
term buyer and seller of patents, whose costs in defending title definitely would be
deductible as business expenses. See I.T. 3773, 1945 Cum. BULL. 151.
4. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-2 (1953); see also id. 118, §39.23(a)-15(k)
(1953). These regulations, having appeared unchanged since 1919 (see U.S. Treas.
Reg. 45, Art. 293 (1920 ed. 1921)), have "the efficacy of law" (Jones' Estate v.
Commissioner, 127 F.2d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1942)), or "the force of law" (Hazeltine
Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513, 522 (3d Cir. 1937)), and "no court has, as yet,
had the temerity to hold them invalid." Everett, Deductibility of Legal and Ac-
counting Fees, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 616, 636 (1948).
5. George G. Urquhart, 20 T.C. 944 (1953).
6. Whether part of the expenditures in fact were ordinary and necessary to the
taxpayer's business does not seem disputable; but whether the taxpayer tried to
enhance the asset value of his patent in addition is open to question.
7. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-2 (1953) ; see also id. 118, 39.23 (a)-15 (k)
(1953).
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24(a) (2), 52 STAT. 466 (1938) (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 263). There have been no substantive changes in this section. See
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A65 (1954); SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1954).
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 113(a), 52 STAT. 490 (1938) (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 1012). There have been no material changes in this section pertinent
to this Comment. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A266 (1954) ; SEN.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 422 (1954).
10. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §23(1), 52 STAT. 462 (1938) (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167).
11. There seems to be great confusion in rationalizing all the cases involving
"title"; see Everett, supra note 4, at 636; however, it seems agreeable to the corn-
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fense of title" regulation,' 2 and some courts even seem to attach special
significance to the label "title" and thus have held that expenditures must
be capitalized if there is an issue of title present, even though it appears
that no more was accomplished than proof of an existing title.13 Such
a rule has provoked criticism from the writers because the value of prop-
erty is not enhanced by the suit.14 On the other hand, even where title
is not in issue, under the broad language of Section 24(a) (2) courts have
capitalized the cost of litigation in cases that involve other long-term
property interests. Thus, the costs of litigation were ordered capitalized
where incurred by a lessee in establishing his right to use certain fixtures
on leased property,15 or a life tenant litigating his interest in property.'6
The same rationale is applied in trademark infringement suits where busi-
ness deductions have been disallowed because the right to exclusive use of
the trade name is necessarily established. 17 The instant case marks the
first opportunity for a court to pass upon the Commissioner's position that
the "defense of title" regulation is applicable to a determination of validity
of a patent.'8
Patent infringement litigation can involve questions of title,'9 but most
frequently this type of case involves only the issues of validity-the inven-
mentators that expenditures which actually benefit the property should be capitalized.
See McDonald, Deductio of Attorneys' Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes,
103 U. OF PA. L. REv. 168, 189-90 (1954) ; compare Everett, supra note 4, at 622,
with Gitlin and Woodward, Tax Aspects of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, in
2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 59 (Practicing Law Inst. 1953).
12. The few instances in which a court or the Treasury has stated that "benefits"
or "increase in value" are the determinative factors in these cases, are cited in
McDonald, supra note 11, at 189 n.203. By such analysis, the result of the suit,
rather than the purpose for which suit is brought, commands the personality of the
expenditure.
13. E.g., Vernor v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 532, 534 (Ct Cl. 1938);
Aluminum Products Co., 24 B.T.A. 420, 425 (1931). Cf. Safety Tube Corp. v.
Commissioner, 168 F2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948).
14. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 189; compare ALI FFD. INcozM TAX
STAT. §X166(a), comment (Feb. 1954 Draft) which states that the regulation
should be modified "to permit an expense deduction where nothing is accomplished
beyond preservation of an existing title."
15. Bush Terminal Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1954)
and cases cited at 578 n.6.
16. Schick v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1067 (1931).
17. Food Fair of Virginia, Inc., 14 T.C. 1089 (1950); L.J. Skaggs, P-H 1942
T.C. Mem. Dec. [42243; cf. Aluminum Products Co., 24 B.T.A. 420 (1931);
Mark W. Allen, P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1143168. But cf. F. Meyer & Brother
Co., 4 B.T.A. 481 (1926), approved in Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145,
150 (1928) (costs of making an accounting for profits by the alleged infringer pur-
suant to court order); Ward v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 743 (D. Mass. 1940)
(semble) (settlement costs of patent suit).
18. In 1920, an opinion by the Committee on Appeals and Review, the forerunner
of the tax court, held that "expenditures made solely to protect the rights of [a]
company from infringement" were not properly capitalized. A.R.R. 98, 2 Cum.
BuLL. 105, 107 (1920) (italics added).
19. The perfect patent analogy to title would be an interference proceeding in
the Patent Office rather than an infringement suit in a 'court. Expenditures in-
curred therein are treated as part of the patent's cost. See Gitlin and Woodward,
supra note 11, at 60.
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tive relationship between a particular claim and "prior art" 2 ---and of in-
fringement-the question of improper invasion of a valid patent claim.2 1
Before the instant case, however, all reported controversies over the tax
consequences of the litigation costs incurred in patent infringement cases
have included a determination on the issue of title.22 These cases resulted
in the capitalization of all or a part of the costs as attributable to the estab-
lishment of title; the distinction between capitalization and deduction lay
between the issues of title and infringement, and the courts ignored the
import of validity. Although the patent suit in question was decided solely
on the issue of validity and never reached a question of recovering profits
for infringement,2 the court has allowed a deduction of the costs on the
theory that the purpose of the litigation is recovery of profits. This ignores
the long-term benefits inherent in a decision on validity of a patent. The
United States Patent Office does not render a final judgment on patent
validity32 4 The complexity of many patents and the difficulty frequently
encountered in tracing and determining the "prior art" 25 result in un-
certainty and invite controversy regarding the permissible bounds of many
patent claims.2 6 Unless validity is expressly excluded from the case, a
decision in the normal infringement case in favor of the patent owner lends
added certainty to the scope of the patent; a specific holding of validity
undoubtedly results in enhancing a long-term asset.2 This is especially
true if the infringer is a large concern with ample funds with which to
research the "prior art" exhaustively, for a decision against such an in-
20. See TOULMIN, HANDBOOK OF PATENTS 393 (1954).
21. Id. at 491. 3 WALKER, PATENTS §450 (Deller ed. 1937).
22. See Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948);
William A. Falls, 7 T.C. 66 (1946).
23. Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Urquhart, 175 F.2d 408 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 826 (1949).
24. 66 STAT. 812 (1952), 35 U.S.C. §282 (1952). See TouLmiN, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 497 & n.35.
25. TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 389-96.
26. This is especially true in a so-called "crowded art" where the slightest
revision of a process may constitute an infringement. Compare Riesenfeld, The
New American Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv.
723, 748-49 (1954).
An unreasonable delay in bringing suit may result in operation of the doctrine
of laches. TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 492, 494 n.22; 3 WALleR, op. cit.
supra note 21, § 575. Moreover, the economic importance of determining the scope
and extent of patent claims seems to outweigh the possible reluctance of small patent
owners to engage in costly infringement suits. Thus, it appears that regardless of
the manner in which these litigation costs are disposed, the amount of infringement
litigation will be unaffected except to the limited extent that large concerns, whose
litigation policies often are more ambitious than those of smaller firms (compare
language of Wallace, J., in Hughes Tool Co. v. Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525, 554 (E.D.
Okla. 1953)), can anticipate a decrease in their income tax occasioned by the institu-
tion of suit in seemingly unimportant infringement circumstances.
27. Since the infringer is enjoined from similar competition, 66 STAT. 812
(1952), 35 U.S.C. §283 (1952), the patentee may acquire the entire market and thus
increase the value of his asset; additionally, the finding of validity clearly results
in a more marketable asset, usually immediately upon completion of the suit.
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fringer, in practical consequence, virtually assures the patentee against
further attacks on validity.2 8 Thus it appears that the rationale behind
capitalizing litigation expenditures in title or similar cases has equal ap-
plication on the issue of patent validity.
The decision in the instant case might be justified on the ground that
in no sense was the value of the taxpayer's patent enhanced by the result
of the litigation. Even if its value were not completely destroyed, to add
the expense of litigating to the capital cost of the remainder is not con-
sistent with the theory of capitalizing expenditures 9 This consideration
may well have influenced the court in its determination; however, the hold-
ing also reaches the case in which the patentee successfully prosecutes his
claim. The result of such a holding is that in no patent infringement suits
will any of the costs be capitalized, for, under the court's test, a fortiori
these suits are brought to recover profits. On first blush such a rule may
be defended because of the practical difficulties which a court faces in
attempting to apportion litigation expenses precisely between the amounts
attributable to recovering profits and to increasing the value of the capital
asset,80 especially where the patentee loses.3 1 However, some courts hav'e
utilized an apportionment formula which, despite its imperfections, at least
allocates some of the cost of a successful litigation involving titlea2 to
capital. There is no apparent reason why such an apportionment policy
should not be followed where there is a successful defense of validity.
28. In law, validity judgments bind only the immediate parties and only as to
the particular claims controverted. See 2 WALmm, op. cit. supra note 21, § 278;
ToULMIN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 494 n.23. Comtpare Jungerson v. Morris Kaysen
Co., 31 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Pa. 1940), with Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335
U.S. 560 (1949). In a "crowded art," this legal principle seems to have similar
practical effects, i.e., a non-litigant probably will not be overly influenced by a
validity finding. However, if a single claim is upheld on numerous occasions, it
seems likely that that claim, and perhaps the patent, will be beyond reproach.
29. No case has been found in which the loser was forced to capitalize. See
S. Cupples Scudder, 22 B.T.A. 1294 (1931). The "compromise cases" are dis-
tinguishable from the case of a loser in that the taxpayer in the former situation
retains the property in question; hence, the extra-judicial settlement may well have
enhanced the property. See, e.g., Food Fair of Virginia, Inc., 14 T.C. 1089 (1950);
Laemmle v. Eisner, 275 Fed. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
30. See 23 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 493, 495 (1955).
31. Apportionment was not feasible in the instant case because there was "no
factual basis upon which to predicate an allocation ... " Brief for Appellee,
p. 23 n.5.
32. For examples of cases in which there has been an apportionment, see
Agnes P. Coke, 17 TC. 403, 409 (1951), aff'd, 201 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1953);
William A. Falls, 7 T.C. 66 (1946). However, not all courts apportion. Those that do
not apportion, use the "primary" test by which disposition of the expenditures
depends on what was the "primary" issue involved in the litigation. Compare
Hochschild v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947), Rassenfoss v. Commis-
sioner, 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946), with Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner, 168
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948). For a general discussion, and for additional examples
of judicial use of the "primary" test, see McDonald, supra note 11, at 189.
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International Law-
SUPREME COURT PERMITS COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST SOVEREIGN NOT GROWING OUT
OF THE SAME TRANSACTION
In 1948 an official agency of the Republic of China I deposited $200,000
with the defendant bank. Upon subsequent refusal of the bank to honor a
request for withdrawal, the agency commenced suit on behalf of the Nation-
alist Government to recover the funds. In addition to several defenses,
the bank interposed two counterclaims for approximately $1,600,000 on
defaulted treasury notes 2 of the sovereign plaintiff. Upon plea of sover-
eign immunity, the district court granted summary judgment for the sover-
eign on the counterclaims, and, while appeal before the circuit court was
pending, denied leave for the defendant bank to amend the counterclaims by
designating them setoffs.4 The circuit court affirmed both decisions 5 on
the ground that the claims of the defendant were not based on the subject
matter of the sovereign's suit and were, therefore, barred by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, with
three Justices dissenting, holding that so long as the defendant's claim was
limited to the sum sought by the sovereign it was valid irrespective of the
fact that it grew out of a totally distinct transaction. National City Bank
of New York v. Republic of China, 75 Sup. Ct. 423 (1955).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon 6 in which the
Court refused to entertain an action by an American citizen to libel a French
warship. The rationale behind the rule is a desire to avoid embarrassing
the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs and to extend recognition
to the dignity of foreign sovereigns. 7 This immunity is said to be based
1. Hereinafter called the Nationalist Government.
2. The first counterclaim is based upon 1920 Republic of China Treasury notes
given by the sovereign to a banking syndicate of which defendant was a member
to secure a loan made by the syndicate to a development company. The loan was
not repaid and upon liquidation of the development company the syndicate bought
the collateral at a public sale. The second counterclaim is based upon 1947
Nationalist Government Treasury notes purchased at par by defendant's Shanghai
representative at the time of issuance.
3. Republic of China v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 108 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
4. Republic of China v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 14 F.R.D. 186 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). Defendant probably attempted to limit his counterclaim to a setoff on the
theory that recovery against a sovereign must be limited to the amount of the
sovereign's claim. This would seem to be the law. See Hungarian People's Re-
public v. Cecil Associates, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; French Re-
public v. Inland Navigation Co., 263 Fed. 410 (E.D. Mo. 1920); cf. United States
v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
5. Republic of China v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 208 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1953).
6. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The application of sovereign immunity to
maritime ventures of a sovereign has been the subject of much comment. See, e.g.,
Fairman, Some Disputed Applications of the Principle of State Immunity, 22 Am.
J. INT'L L. 566, 575-83 (1928).
7. See Lauterpacht, The Problem, of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 221-26 (1951) ; 2 HAcKWoRTH, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 393 (1941).
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upon the implied consent of the sovereign,8 and the courts in applying the
doctrine have looked to the executive for sovereign approval.9 Therefore,
it would seem that the judiciary does not have the ultimate power, with-
out executive approval, to abrogate it.10 As a general exception to sovereign
immunity, courts often have permitted counterclaims growing out of the
same transaction as that which is the basis of the sovereign's suit." This
exemption is supported by the theory that the sovereign, by submitting to
the jurisdiction of the court, has "waived" its immunity,'2 and, therefore,
the defendant may counterclaim. The instant case represents a significant
change in prior law by permitting a counterclaim which does not arise
out of the same transaction as the sovereign's suit.13
The Court in the instant case based its decision primarily upon the
consideration that as a matter of fair play a sovereign should not be per-
mitted to invoke the jurisdiction of our courts against our nationals without
submitting to counterclaims which would fairly curtail its recovery.' 4 This
position is eminently reasonable where the sovereign and the private citizen
are contending over liability arising out of the same or a closely related
transaction. Moreover, in light of the new era of liberal counterclaims,'8
it may be reasonable to permit a counterclaim arising from a different
transaction where the sovereign freely initiates suit and the defendant has
a legitimate but unrelated claim against it. But it is a different matter en-
tirely where the machinations of the defendant compel the sovereign to sue
and thus enable the defendant to raise unrelated counterclaims. In the
instant case it seems clear that the defendant forced the lawsuit by refusing
to honor the request for the deposit. It is not clear from the reported facts
8. Instant case at 428; The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 393.
9. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943). However, the law is not so well
settled that the judiciary will always defer to the executive. See Lyons, The
Conchlsiveiwss of the "Suggestion" and Certificate of the Anerican State Depart-
ment, 24 Bir. Y.B. INT'L L. 116, 128-29 (1947).
10. Instant case at 431-32 (dissenting opinion); see Cardozo, Sovereign Ian-
munity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARv. L. Rv. 608 (1954). But
cf. Lyons, supra note 9, at 128-29; JAFFE, JuDIcIAL AsPECTs OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
53 (1933).
11. E.g., Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir.
1952); United States v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 83 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 563 (1936) ; United States v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 90 F. Supp.
448 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
12. See, e.g., Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230, 233
(2d Cir. 1952). For a statement that the waiver rationale is a fiction, see Republic
of China v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 108 F. Supp. 766, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
13. The following cases refused to allow a counterclaim arising from a different
transaction: Republic of China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 105 F. Supp. 411 (D.D.C. 1952);
United States v. New York Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Republic
of Haiti v. Plesch, 190 Misc. 407, 73 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
14. Instant case at 429.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) permits permissive counterclaims which do not arise
out of the same transaction for which suit is brought. It must be noted, however,
that the rationale for this liberalization, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, is not ap-
plicable to a sovereign since it is not subject to direct suit.
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of the case whether defendant had a reason for refusing payment other
than that of compelling the sovereign to sue. Possibly, the defendant was
protecting itself against a future claim to the funds by the People's Republic
of China as successor of the Nationalist Government.16 This difficulty,
however, might have been avoided by paying the money into court and
seeking a declaratory judgment to ascertain the rightful owner.17 On
the other hand, it might be argued that if the instant decision is limited
to its facts the result is equitable. While it is true that the defendant
caused the suit by withholding the deposits, nevertheless it paid full con-
sideration for the treasury notes, one series of which was issued as recently
as 1947. Therefore, to permit the counterclaim in the instant case does
not offend our sense of justice. The chief difficulty in the instant case is
that, if not limited to its facts, it invites a practice which will effectively
circumvent and may ultimately destroy the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
It would be a relatively easy matter for a financial institution which had
in its possession valuables of a sovereign to buy up at discount defaulted
negotiable instruments or claims against the sovereign or a predecessor
government,' 8 and upon suit by the sovereign interpose them as counter-
claims to the extent of the sovereign's claim. The holders of these de-
faulted obligations would be willing to sell at a discount, for whatever re-
muneration is received represents a sum which could not be recovered
by direct action against the sovereign. Nor would such transactions neces-
sarily be limited to financial institutions; either the tortfeasor or contract
breacher, anticipating trial, could insure himself against liability to the
sovereign by the simple expedient of buying at discount sufficient defaulted
obligations.
In the future, the courts in determining the scope of the instant opinion
will certainly be influenced by the generally hostile attitude which the Court
has shown towards the doctrine. In its opinion the Court traces the
general deterioration of the protection and relies specifically on the restric-
tive policy which the State Department has taken towards sovereign
immunity. However, this policy does not generally attack the doctrine
but rather its application to the situation in which the sovereign engages
in what is normally private commercial enterprise. 19 Sovereign immunity
16. A right of action belonging to one sovereign will pass to its successor, if
the succession was in accord with principles of international law as interpreted by
this government. See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870); Land
Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1940).
17. In Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir.
1951) upon suit by the Nationalist Government to recover a deposit the court al-
lowed the defendant to pay the money into the court and, upon interpleader of
Communist China as a defendant, dismissed the original defendant. There would
seem to be no logical reason for not allowing the defendant in the instant case to
seek the same relief via a declaratory judgment.
18 It would seem that a successor state is liable for the public debts of its
predecessor. See O'Connell, Secured and Unsecured Debts in the Law of State
Succession, 28 Bar. Y.B. INTr'L L. 204, 205 (1951).
19. See 26 DE,'T SATE BULL 984-85 (1952). The Supreme Court in Berizzi
Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), unanimously rejected the dis-
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theoretically rests upon the consent of the sovereign and supposedly aids
it in the conduct of foreign affairs. Since it is the executive generally and
the State Department specifically who are primarily concerned with the
course of foreign affairs, in the absence of an executive pronouncement
specifically approving the practice, the courts should not permit "discount
counterclaims," especially since to permit such would tend to disrupt com-
mercial and investment transactions between United States' nationals and
foreign sovereigns.
Labor Law-
EMPLOYEE'S COMMUNIST AFFILIATIONS "CAUSE"
FOR DISCHARGE UNDER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
In 1946 Doris Walker obtained employment with Cutter Laboratories,
manufacturers of antibiotics, but failed to disclose previous positions and
portions of her educational background. In 1947 management investi-
gated her alleged Communist Party affiliations but took no action. Two
years later, after the union and Cutter had commenced wage negotiations,
the investigation was reopened. In the midst of these negotiations and
following a union radio and newspaper appeal to the public, Walker, then
president of the local union, was discharged. Cutter notified all employees
that she had been discharged because of the misrepresentations on the
1946 employment application and her active membership in the Com-
munist Party. The latter allegation was based on Walker's refusal to
answer questions concerning her alleged Communist Party membership,
on reports of the Tenney Committee' listing people with whom she had as-
sociated, on newspaper reports, on a photostatic copy of a letter allegedly
written by her, and on two unidentified, undated documents which stated
that she had joined the Communist Party in 1942. The union protested
that the discharge violated the prohibition in the existing collective bar-
gaining agreement against discharge without "just cause." Upon sub-
mission to arbitration it was found that since 1947 Cutter had known
substantially the facts constituting the asserted grounds for discharge and
that by not acting sooner had waived these grounds. The Board ordered
reinstatement declaring that the real reason for discharge was Walker's
tinction drawn by Judge Mack in The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), be-
tween commercial and military ships. This opinion has not been well received.
See Cardozo, supra note 10, at 607; 40 HARv. L. REv. 126, 127 (1926); 6 B.U.L.
REV. 275 (1926). Contra: 36 YALE L.J. 145, 146 (1926). In light of the afore-
mentioned State Department position, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court today
would affirm its former position in Pesaro.
1. For an account of the activities of this committee, see BAau.arr, THE TENNEY
CommrrTEE; LEGisL.TiV INVESTIGATION OF SuBvERsIVE AcTIVITiES IN CALIFORNIA
(1951).
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union activity.2  The superior court 3 and the district court of appeals
affirmed.4  On appeal, the California Supreme Court with three justices
dissenting held that an arbitration award which directs that a member of
the Communist Party be reinstated to employment is against public policy
and unenforceable.5 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 278 P.2d 905 (Cal.
1955).
At common law, in the absence of a contract, the employer may dis-
charge an employee for any reason. 6 In some states this right is restricted
by statutes forbidding discharge on the ground of an employee's political
activities, 7 union activities,8 or race, religion or national origin.9  How-
ever, interpretations of these statutes indicate that they will not prohibit
an employer from discharging on the ground that the employee is a com-
munist.10 Also, recent federal administrative rulings indicate that the
Taft-Hartley Act will not protect employees discharged because of their
communist affiliations."' Therefore, protection must be found, if at all,
in collective bargaining agreement provisions that an employer may dis-
charge only for "cause." In sensitive industries involving national se-
curity it is well established that an employer has "cause" when an employee
has been denied clearance pursuant to government security provisions.'
2
Cases involving the discharge of communists in non-sensitive employment
fall into several groups. 13 In some of these cases the employee had com-
2. Cutter Laboratories, 15 Lab. Arb. 431 (1950).
3. Cutter Laboratories v. Bio-Lab Union, CIO, 16 Lab. Arb. 208 (1951).
4. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 266 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1954).
5. For a popular account of this case, see Jacobs, Should Communists Be Allowed
to Eat?, The Reporter, March 24, 1955, p. 26.
6. Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 941 (1953).
7. E.g., CAL. LAB. CoDE §§1101, 1102 (1943).
8. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(1) (c) (1952).
9. E.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 290-301.
10. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
28 Cal.2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946), interpreting sections of California Labor Code,
supra note 7; see Note, Job Inquiries in New York About "Subversive" Member-
ship, 28 L.R.R.M. 96 (1952).
11. Administrative Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. 916, 33
L.R.R.M. 1526 (1954); for similar rulings see: id., Case No. 797, 32 L.R.R.M. 1619
(1953); id., Case No. 661, 32 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1953). Under the Taft-Hartley Act
even though an employer actually has "cause" for discharge of an employee, if it is
found that he in fact discharged for a "cause" prohibited by the statute, the dis-
charge will not be upheld. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 41 N.L.R.B. 872
(1942), enforcement granted, 138 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1943). Thus, in the instant
case since the arbitrators found that Cutter had discharged Walker because of her
union activity, the discharge could not tLe upheld under this act even if her com-
munist affiliations do constitute "cause" for discharge. However, since there is
no appeal from the refusal of the NLRB General Counsel to act, it appears that
few, if any, cases involving this problem will get before the Board. 61 STAT. 139
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1952) ; see Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187 (D.C.
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930 (1953).
12. Arma Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 325 (1954); Liquid Carbonic Corp., 22 Lab.
Arb. 709 (1954) ; Bell Aircraft Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. 234 (1951) ; Bell Aircraft
Corp., 13 Lab. Arb. 513 (1949); cf. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 9 Lab. Arb. 77 (1947).
13. For a general discussion of cases involving this problem, see Note, 62 YALE
L.J. 954 (1953).
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mitted specific acts of misconduct which in themselves constituted "cause"
for dismissal. 14 In another the employee's fellow workers objected to his
continued presence in the plant, and the resulting dissension and potential
violence were held to constitute "cause" for discharge.15 A third group
of cases involves employees working for news agencies as editorial writers 16
or reporters. 17 Dismissal was upheld on the theory that a newspaper
or news service has a "quasi-public responsibility" to report the news
impartially and that requiring the employer to retain such an employee
would cause the reading public to lose confidence in the veracity of the
reporting.' 8 Where none of the above factors was present, it has been
held by arbitrators that mere membership in the Communist Party or
questionable loyalty does not constitute "cause" for dismissal and in each
case reinstatement was ordered.19 The rationale of these decisions was
that membership in the Communist Party is not illegal 20 and that "even
a Communist is entitled to earn a living" 21 so long as his employment does
not actually harm the employer.22  Since under existing law Cutter had
clearly waived its objection to the 1946 misrepresentations on the employ-
ment application,2 the only ground for upholding Walker's discharge was
the allegation of her communist affiliations. In approving discharge for
this reason, the judgment of the court in the instant case represents a
significant deviation from prior arbitrators' decisions.
It is clear that no present national security issue is involved in the
instant case since Cutter Laboratories never has been designated as a
"defense facility" under the Internal Security Act of 1950V4 The factors
favoring upholding discharge of employees in such non-sensitive industries
because of their suspected disloyalty are limited to the possibility of future
14. Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 19 Lab. Arb. 40 (1952) (linotype
operator substituted "fascism" for "freedom" in speech by Secretary of Navy);
Consolidated Western Steel Corp., 13 Lab. Arb. 721 (1949) (employee published
false and malicious statements about employer).
15. Jackson Industries, Inc., 9 Lab. Arb. 753 (1948). But cf. Chrysler Corp.,
19 Lab. Arb. 408 (1952).
16. Los Angeles Daily News, 19 Lab. Arb. 39 (1952).
17. United Press Ass'n, 22 Lab. Arb. 679 (1954).
18. Los Angeles Daily News, 19 Lab. Arb. 39 (1952); United Press Ass'n,
22 Lab. Arb. 679, 682 (1954) (but employee ordered reinstated because employer
failed to prove alleged cause for discharge).
19. J. H. Day Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 751 (1954); Foote Bros. Gear & Machine
Corp., 13 Lab. Arb. 848 (1949); Spokane-Idaho Mining Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 749
(1947); cf. Chrysler Corp., 18 Lab. Arb. 836 (1952).
20. Spokane-Idaho Mining Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 749, 751 (1947).
21. Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp., 13 Lab. Arb. 848, 864 (1949).
22. J. H. Day Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 751, 755 (1954), 53 Micar. L. REv. 625 (1955).
(1955).
23. J. H. Day Co., supra note 22; Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp.,
13 Lab. Arb. 848 (1949); Ford Motor Car Co., 17 L.R.R.M. 2681 (1945).
24. 64 STAT. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §784(a),(b) (1952). Section 784(a) pro-
vides that it is unlawful for a person to obtain employment in "defense facilities"
without first disclosing his communist affiliations; § 784(b) authorizes the Secretary
of Defense to publish a list of plants designated as "defense facilities" for security
purposes.
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sabotage, the potential damage to the employer's reputation and business,
and the employer's anxiety in retaining such employees on his payroll.
Against these considerations must be weighed the serious consequences
to the individual who may be discharged as a communist. The individual
may be unable to obtain work because some industries utilize black lists
of alleged communists, 2 5 and in the others, unless the applicant falsifies his
past employment record, a routine investigation will reveal his previous
dismissal as a communist. Moreover, in some states the employee may
be unable to collect unemployment compensation.m2 6 Besides the economic
impact, if the basis for discharge is made public, such a dismissal would be
accompanied by loss of social status and subjection to public opprobrium.
While the delicacy of balancing these interests makes prediction difficult,
a recent decision indicates that other courts will follow the holding of the
instant case that an employee's Communist Party affiliation constitutes
"cause" when the issue is presented under a collective bargaining agree-
ment.27  However, this problem appears likely to affect only a small seg-
ment of industry since more employers are screening prospective employees
by inserting in their employment applications questions relating to com-
munist affiliations 28 and are bargaining with the union for the right to
discharge employees on the ground of communist affiliations.
29
The California legislature has enacted a comprehensive system of
legislation to protect the security of the state and deal with the communist
problem.30 Included within this system are laws providing for registra-
tion of subversive organizations, 81 exclusion of communists from state
employment 3 2 and laws punishing criminal syndicalism ss and sabotage.
4
Since the legislature has purported to deal with the communist threat
as it affects the security of the state, it seems that if the declaration of public
policy enunciated in this case represents the views of the legislature, it might
have come more appropriately from that body. Indeed, such judicial
self-restraint would have been more consistent with California's long stand-
25. See MILLER, THE JUDGES AND THE JUDGED (1952).
26. E.g., OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 1345-6 (Supp. 1952), constitutionality
upheld, Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (C.P. 1950).
See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §2509 (Supp. 1954) (similar requirement in
public assistance law).
27. United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co., 127 F. Supp. 934
(D.D.C. 1955). Cf. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844
(9th Cir. 1954); Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950).
2. For sample questions, see NATIONAL INDUSTRLAL CONFERENCE BOARD, In-
dustrial Security: Combatting Subversion and Sabotage in 60 SrUDIES IN BUSINESS
PoLIcY 52 (1952). Cutter Laboratories inserted such questions in 1949.
29. For a discussion of collective bargaining agreements containing such a right,
see NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, op. cit. supra note 28, at 64-68.
30. For a comprehensive list of California statutes, see GELLHORN, THE STATES
AND SUBVERSION, App. B at 416-17 (1952).
31. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. §§35000-302 (West 1955).
32. CAL. GovT. CODE § 1028 (Supp. 1947); id. § 1023 (1944).
33. CAL. GEN. LAWS act 8428 (1944).
34. CAL. GEN. LAws act 8427 (1944).
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ing policy of enforcing arbitrators' awards unless the arbitrators clearly
have abused their authority 3 5
Accepting the fact that Communist Party affiliations may lead to
discharge of an employee either indirectly by inclusion in the concept of
"Ccause" or directly by so providing in collective bargaining agreements
or by legislation, the serious consequences to the individual make it im-
perative that adequate procedural safeguards be made available to protect
the innocent. In the instant case, the type of evidence on which Cutter
based its charge of communist affiliation clearly was admissible in an
arbitration proceeding which is informal and not bound by judicial rules
of evidence.8 6 Also, in such proceedings the burden of proof which the
employer will have to meet will vary with the individual arbitrator.s7
For these reasons, it is questionable whether this type of proceeding pro-
vides enough protection for the rights of employees facing charges of dis-
loyalty, especially in light of the narrow scope of review afforded such
hearings.3 8 Although one solution might be a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement or a stipulation by the parties in the submission
agreement that the arbitration proceeding shall be a "trial-type" hearing
in which there is confrontation of witnesses and the preparation of a
verbatim record including findings of fact, there is no guarantee to the
individual employee that such provisions will be made. Also, it seems
unlikely that the individual employee would be able to remove the de-
termination of the fact issue of whether or not he is a communist to a
court of law.39 Some protection of the innocent perhaps is found in the
availability of a defamation suit which could arise out of unfounded allega-
tions of communism; 4 0 however, the cost of such an action, the difficulty
35. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANNOArTIDNS §§ 1288, 1289 (West 1955). See Pacific
Vegetable Qil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal2d 228, 174 P.2d 441 (1946); Kagel,
California Arbitration Statute, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 825-28 (1950).
36. Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal2d 515, 212 P.2d 233 (1949). See Singer, Labor
Arbitration: Should It Be Fornmal Or Informal?, 2 L". L.J. 89 (1951); Singer,
Labor Arbitration.: Use of Legal Rules of Evidence, 2 LAB. L.J. 185 (1951).
37. ELEoum, How ARBrrATION Woans 164-67 (1952).
38. See note 35 supra; Morris White Fashions, Inc. v. Susquehanna Mills, Inc.,
295 N.Y. 450, 68 N.E.2d 437 (1946); Rosenbaum v. Drucker, 346 Pa. 434, 31 A.2d
117 (1943) ; Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 681 (1950).
39. After arbitration the employee should not be able to attack the arbitration
award in a suit against the employer for breach of contract because to allow him
to bring this new suit would nullify one of the purposes of arbitration which is to
avoid litigation and minimize expenses. ELKOURI, op. cit. supra note 37, at 9-10.
In the absence of an arbitration clause, in a few states the employee has no right
to sue the employer for an alleged wrongful discharge. 1 TELLER, LAoR DIsPuaEs
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 165 (1940). But in the majority of the states he
would have an action against the employer. Id. §§ 166-68. However, most collective
bargaining agreements contain an arbitration clause; therefore, it seems that many
employees will be precluded from bringing an action against the employer for wrong-
ful discharge since the discharge will have been submitted to arbitration.
40. Appellation of "communist" held libelous per se, Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d
619 (7th Cir. 1947); Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947);
Joopanenko v. Gavagan, 67 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1953). Calling person a "communist"
held slanderous per se, Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953).
Contra: Keefe v. O'Brien, 203 Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952). For
discussion of cases, see Comment, 18 U. DEr. L.J. 189 (1955).
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of proving "publication," the potential defense of "privilege," 41 and, ir-
respective of the decision, its failure to clear his name may discourage the
average employee from bringing it. Thus, the difficulty of guaranteeing
the individual employee adequate procedural safeguards together with the
potential harm incident to discharge as a communist present a problem
which, if unsolved, may be a strong factor that should be considered in
the determination of whether or not communist affiliation should con-
stitute "cause" for discharge. Perhaps even more important is the realiza-
tion that the procedural problem is critical in the administration of current
collective bargaining agreements that specifically provide for discharge on
this basis.
WRL-
PARTIAL RIE VOCATION AN) INTERIREITATION
OF REMAINING LANGUAGE
Testator executed a 'valid will which, in addition to equal legacies
to his nieces and nephews, contained pecuniary legacies to two of his three
sisters and a residuary clause which read: "the rest to be divided between
my three sisters." The sister who had not been given any gift predeceased
the testator who thereafter crossed out the word "three" in the residuary
clause and, without formally reexecuting the will, inserted the word "two."
The court held that there was a valid revocation of the word "three," that
the insertion of the word "two" was nugatory, that the remaining words,
"my sisters," should be interpreted to include the deceased sister as well
as the two surviving sisters and that, therefore, under the Pennsylvania
anti-lapse statute the daughter of the deceased sister takes her mother's
share. In re Estate of Wright, 380 Pa. 106, 110 A.2d 198 (1955).
The instant case presents three problems of law: the first is whether
there was a valid partial revocation. Pennsylvania courts have interpreted
the Wills Act to permit such revocations.1 This determination rests pri-
marily on whether the court will be willing to effectuate the language re-
maining after the "revocation." 2 Courts have sustained partial revoca-
tions where a specific gift has been decreased,3 but generally, they have
not been willing to sustain those which result either in an increase in the
41. The employer in this situation may have a conditional privilege on the
basis of the communication being necessary to his business. RESTATEmENT, TORTS
§593-94 (1938); PROssER, TORTS 831-33 (1941).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950). See In re Sando's Estate, 362 Pa.
1, 66 A.2d 312 (1949).
2. Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478 (1883) ; Jackson v. Halloway, 7 Johns. 395
(N.Y. 1811).
3. Guth's Estate, 19 Lehigh L.J. 351 (Lehigh County, Pa., Orphans Ct. 1941).
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amount of the share or in the number of takers.4 This rule, however, is
subject to the exception of increases in the residue 5 or increases in the
shares of residuary legatees resulting from the striking of one or more
residuary legatees 6 which are upheld on the rationale that the residue is
the "catch-all" for all undisposed property.7 Thus, even if the instant
court had interpreted "my sisters" to exclude the deceased sister, thereby
increasing the shares of the surviving sisters, the revocation would be
upheld as falling within the exception for residuary gifts.
The second problem which the court might have considered is whether
the striking of the word "three" was dependent upon the efficacy of the
word "two" in effecting a new disposition.8 The silence of the court
on the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is illustrative of the fact
that Pennsylvania courts have rarely used the doctrine as a necessary
ground for their decisions. 9 In any event, the facts of the instant case
show that the testator intended the revocation to be absolute; consequently,
he would have preferred that the court construe the remaining language,
"my sisters," rather than allowing the original will to stand. His third
sister had died, and he no longer believed it necessary to provide for her.
Furthermore, his nieces and nephews had been provided for equally; there-
fore, the testator obviously did not prefer the deceased sister's child over
the others. Unless the testator was thinking of treating the family as
three equal branches it is inconceivable that he would want the original
will to stand; in fact, the striking of "three" would preclude any idea of
equality among the three branches of the family. In view of these facts
it would appear the testator quite dearly did not want his deceased sister
to take.
Since the partial revocation was valid and absolute, the third question
is whether the will as revised by the revocation included the deceased
sister as a member of the class. The effect of the general rule of con-
struction for bequests and devises of a present estate, that members of a
4. Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478 (1883); McPherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf.
92 (N.Y. 1854); ATKINSON, WILLS 445 (2d ed. 1953). But cf. Fletcher Trust Co.
v. Morse, 97 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. App.), reversed ow. facts, 230 Ind. 44, 101 N.E.2d
658 (1951).
Thus, if testator attempted to strike "except A and B" from an original bequest
which read "to all my children, except A and B," the courts would hold that there
was not a valid partial revocation.
5. Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102 (1877); Collard v. Collard, 67 At1. 190
(N.J. 1907). Contra: Mile's Appeal, 68 Conn. 237, 36 AtI. 39 (1896).
6. Lindeman's Estate, 141 Pa. Super. 225, 14 A.2d 837 (1940), in which the
court gave effect to the testator's striking the name of one of four persons to whom
the residue was left, illustrates the typical situation in which courts have held that
there was a valid partial revocation. See Tomlinson's Estate, 133 Pa. 245, 19
Atl. 482 (1890); cf. In the Matter of Willits, 112 N.Y. 289 (1889).
7. Note, 23 HiRv. L. Rxv. 558, 559 (1910).
8. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47 S.E. 501 (1904); ATKINSON,
WILLS 452 (2d ed. 1953); Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation., 33 HARV. L.
REv. 337, 345 (1920).
9. BRAGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES Acr OF 1947, at 2371 (1949).
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class are determined at the death of the testator, 0 has been modified by
the anti-lapse provision of the Wills Act" which provides that "in the
absence of a contrary intent appearing [in the will] . . . a devise or
bequest to . . . a sister . . . whether designated by name or as one
of a class shall not lapse if the beneficiary shall fail to survive the testator
and shall leave issue surviving the testator, but shall pass to the surviving
issue. . . ." Therefore, if the deceased sister is included in the class,
her daughter will take her share. However, under the majority rule
which is followed in Pennsylvania the deceased sister would not be included
in the class if she were dead prior to the execution of the will.1
2
The court, in the instant case, in stating that it would ascertain the
testator's intent at the time he made his revocation '3 recognized that this
was the last time that the testator manifested his intent. Since new language
was created, the will spoke again as of the time of revocation. It should
be noted that courts have held that where a partial revocation was made
by a codicil the will spoke as of the date of the codicil. 14  In the instant
case the partial revocation has been accomplished, not by codicil, but by
an act to the document which was sanctioned by the statute.' 5 There is
no practical difference between these situations; hence, for the purpose of
applying the anti-lapse provision there was, in effect, an execution of new
language. Under the governing rule that the anti-lapse statute applies
only to those members of a class who were alive when the will was executed,
the class in the instant case could only be composed of the two surviving
sisters of the testator.
10. The leading Pennsylvania case is Gross's Estate, 10 Pa. 360 (1849).
11. PA. SrAT. AN. tit. 20, § 180.14(8) (1950).
12. Weber Estate, 155 Pa. Super. 403, 38 A.2d 362 (1944) ; Downing v. Nichol-
son, 115 Iowa 493, 88 N.W. 1064 (1902); Mechem, Problems Under Anti-Lapse
Statutes, 19 IowA L. Rzv. 1, 19 (1933).
The death of a named individual prior to the execution of the will will not
prevent the operation of the anti-lapse statute, on the theory that the testator
probably believed that this individual was alive at the execution of the will. There-
fore, the same policy for utilizing the anti-lapse provisions to save a gift to an
individual who dies after the execution of the will is applicable. See Mechem,
supra at 13. This reasoning is not relevant'where a member of a class dies before
the making of the will. Rather, the courts reason that the testator could not have
intended to provide for a person whom he presumably knew was dead. Id. at 18.
This result is accepted because there is no problem of lapse; there are other members
of the class alive at the execution to preserve the gift.
13. Instant case at 108, 110 A2d at 199.
14. Tyson's Estate (No. 1), 47 Pa. Super. 108 (1911).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5(3) (1950).
